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following parties were named as defendants below, but were 
dismissed prior to the appeal: 
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Ford G. Scalley, David M. Carlson, Lori N. Jerman, of Morgan, 
Scalley & Reading, Salt Lake City. 
Wasatch Chemical Company, a Utah corporation, represented by 
Gary B. Ferguson, Russell C. Fericks, and Brad C. Betebenner, of 
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Retep Corporation, a Utah corporation, represented by Robert 
R. Wallace, of Hanson, Epperson & Smith, and by McCoy A. McMurray. 
Alma G. Peterson, President of Retep, purported to appear pro se on 
behalf of the corporation at some hearings. 
In addition to the counsel listed on the cover sheet, 
plaintiff has been represented in this proceeding by Fred R. 
Silvester, of Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson, Salt Lake City. 
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JURISDICTION 
The appeal is from a final judgment in a civil case. 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j), as amended. Prior to transfer, jurisdiction was 
proper in the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j)# a s amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court correctly rule that the statute of 
limitations ran on appellant's claims several years before his 
complaint was filed? 
2. Did the district court correctly rule that plaintiff did 
not present sufficient evidence to raise a jury question regarding 
applicability of the "discovery rule" exception to the statute of 
limitations? 
3. Was summary judgment appropriate in the absence of 
sufficient evidence to raise a jury question on whether exposure to 
TCE caused appellant's alleged injuries? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: The standard of review is the 
same for each of the issues presented on appeal. Summary judgment 
is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, the moving party is nevertheless entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. The district court's decision is 
reviewed by this Court for correctness. Warren v. Provo City 
Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992). 
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STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann, S 78-12-1: 
Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the 
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the 
cause of action has accrued, except in 
specific cases where a different limitation is 
prescribed by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-25(3): 
Within four years. 
An action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
U.R.Civ.P. 56: 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover 
upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any 
time after the expiration of 2 0 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof. 
* * * 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. . . . 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
* * * 
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(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn 
or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should 
it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
In 1988, plaintiff and appellant Robert Larson ("Larson") 
brought suit against appellees and others (hereinafter "PPG" 
collectively), alleging a myriad of physical and emotional problems 
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resulting from exposure to the chemical trichloroethylene ("TCE") 
from approximately 1964 until approximately 1972.l 
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, 
ruling that Larson's claims were barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. The Court further noted 
that Larson had not adduced evidence to establish that his alleged 
injuries were caused by TCE. (R.531). 
Statement of Uncontroverted Facts 
The following facts were assumed true or uncontroverted in the 
court below: 
Robert Larson began working for Black & Decker as a tool 
repairer in approximately May, 1964. (R.736; R.1249). Shortly 
thereafter, he married his present wife, Marilyn Larson 
("Marilyn"). (R.802-803; R.1450-1451). 
As a tool repairer for Black & Decker, Larson disassembled 
various power tools and, on occasion, cleaned those power tools in 
a vapor degreaser which utilized TCE. (R.737; R.752-753). 
Depending upon the particular day, Larson would lower tools into 
and out of the vapor degreaser as many as fifteen or twenty times. 
(R.752). 
1
 Although PPG and Diamond Shamrock manufactured TCE during 
this time frame, there was considerable doubt whether any of that 
TCE was sold to suppliers from whom Mr. Larson's employer, Black 
and Decker, purchased TCE. For purposes of the Motion for summary 
judgment granted by the district court, PPG and Diamond Shamrock 
assumed that the TCE to which Mr. Larson was allegedly exposed was 
manufactured by them. 
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An air purifying respirator and rubber gloves were available 
for workers using the vapor degreaser. The only time Larson ever 
used the air purifying respirator was to clean the vapor degreaser. 
(R.620-621; R.756; R.983-984; R.1028-1029; R.1145-1146; R.1167-
1168) . A washroom was immediately adjacent to the room in which 
the vapor degreaser was located but Larson rarely, if ever, washed 
his hands following his use of the various degreasers and solvents. 
(R.755; R.949-950; R.956). 
Within a few months of the date he became employed at Black 
and Decker, Larson began to notice physical and emotional symptoms. 
He first noticed mood changes in the Summer of 1964. (R.764; 
R.1011-1012; R.1465-1467; R.1528). Larson began to suffer from 
bleeding sinuses in 1966 and has continued to suffer from this 
symptom since then. (R.776; R.1003-1004; R.1539-1540). Headaches 
began in late 1964 and have continued to the present time. (R.765; 
R.1536-1537) . 
Larson began experiencing irritation from smelling certain 
chemicals in 1965 or 1966. (R.777). He also began to suffer from 
dizziness in the time frame of 1964 through 1969. (R.813; R.1546-
1547). Sometime in the 1960s Larson became impatient, and began to 
lose energy. (R.766-767; R.778-779; R.1547-1548). 
In approximately 1969, Larson became the manager of Black and 
Decker's Salt Lake City facility. (R.737-378; R.758; R.1037; 
R. 1456-1457) . At about the same time that Larson became the 
manager, he also began to experience additional symptoms such as a 
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decreased sex drive, memory loss, slower reaction time, and 
difficulty in "prioritizing" tasks. (R.761; R.770-772; R.1009-
1010; R.1040; R.1545-1546; R. 1560-1561) . 
During the early 1970s, Larson became quite violent and 
emotionally and physically abusive with his family. (R.1481; 
R.1551). In 1986 Larson was demoted from manager to senior tool 
repairer. (R.614; R.634; R.774-775; R.994). He suffered 
depression as a result of this demotion. (R.774; R.1154). 
In approximately 1972, Black and Decker ceased using the TCE 
vapor degreaser and switched to some other form of degreasing 
utilizing a cold solvent. (R.624; R.742; R.789; R.817; R.946-947; 
R.952-957; R.1036-1037; R.1487). Larson does not know the name of 
these new solvents to which he was exposed, or of any other 
solvents to which he has been exposed since that time. (R.742; 
R.945-948) . 
Larson does not trust doctors and sought no medical attention 
for any of his symptoms until early 1985. (R.785-788; R.1004-1006; 
R.1012-1013; R.1014-1015; R.1538-1539; R.1540-1543) . His wife 
would occasionally ask the family doctor about Larson's symptoms 
when she was bringing children in for various problems. (R.783-
786; R.1017-1018; R.1537-1538). 
Q. Okay. Do you remember when you first sought medical 
attention for your headaches? 
A. I am sure it was in the '60's, with Dr. Young. 
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Q. Would you have gone to him specifically for yourself 
on that occasion and said "I need you to fix my 
headaches," or "I've got a problem?" 
A. Probably not. I kind of suffered along with stuff 
and went with my wife or kids or something,and like I 
said before, kind of asked him, "What about headaches?" 
But I don't remember a specific time of myself just going 
in and saying, you know, "We got to figure this out," you 
know, I didn't ever do that. 
(R.1267). 
Mrs. Larson testified that her husband refused to go to 
doctor unless he considered the issue very serious, and that 
didn't consider these matters serious: 
Q. Did he seek medical attention for those headaches? 
A. Our general practitioner, our general family doctor 
had, at different times, tried to have him take different 
things to, you know, try. Robert is not a person that 
wants to ever go to the doctor. I mean he didn't - you 
know, he wouldn't go in for a long time, but if he was in 
there for something else and I would say, you know, he 
has these terribla headaches, is there anything you can 
do for him. And so he would give him a prescription. . 
* * * * * 
Q. Did you seek - did he seek medical attention [for 
his bloody sinuses]? 
A. Probably just through Dr. Young. He's the only 
doctor that Robert ever went to until we went to Dr. 
Lockey [in 1985]. 
Q. Weren't you concerned about the bloody sinuses? 
A. Oh, yeah and -
Q. Was he concerned? 
A. Well, I'm sure he was, but you have to know him to 
know - well, he will - you know, he has to fall down on 
the floor before he'll go to a doctor. I mean, that's 
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how bad he hates to go and so it isn't strange to me that 
he doesn't run to the doctor for things. It has to be 
really serious before he would ever go. 
* * * * * 
Q. Do you know why your husband was so reluctant to go 
to doctors? 
A. Well, he gets nauseated when he walks into a 
hospital. Some people just do and some people don't. I 
don't know. You know, it's just something that he hates 
and he doesn't like, you know. 
Q. He didn't have a traumatic experience with a doctor -
A. Oh, no. 
Q. - when he was young? 
A. In fact, he never went. In fact, I've asked his 
mother many times, you know, and she - he just never had 
to go to the doctor for any reason. 
(R.1537-1538; R.1540; R.1542-1543). 
The statement in Larson's brief that ff[t]he Larsons consulted 
the family doctor concerning the headaches and the bloody sinuses" 
is not supported by the record citation: 
A. . . . And then I have gone and seen Dr. Young 
through the years, and on one of my visits there I am 
sure I have asked him about it, you know, about the 
headaches. And I am sure asked him about that. 
But we never ever said anything to him about 
trichloroethylene or anything. It would have been more 
just, you know, "What do you think causes it and — where 
Q. Anything that you saw Dr. Young — he's your family 
doctor, isn't he? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you tell him what you did for a living? 
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A. I don't think so. 
Q. Did he take a history from you; that is, ask you 
what you did and how old you were and what problems you 
had had in the past? 
A. I don't think so. I think more a lot of the visits 
with him was going in for my wife or one of the kids, and 
lots of times, in passing, we would ask, "What about 
this? What about that?" 
But many of the times we were there it was just — 
maybe I didn't go over there for myself. 
Q. Okay. If you discussed your own condition with Dr. 
Young, it was more incidental? 
A. Correct. 
(R.1006). 
The Larsons assert that several years before filing the 
complaint in this action, they saw a television program concerning 
potential harmful effects of TCE. They are unable to recall the 
date of the alleged television program, the name of the program, 
the network on which the program aired or the identities of any of 
the personalities involved. (R.788-790; R.993-998; R.1457-1461). 
The Larsons alleged that as a result of seeing this unidentified 
television program concerning TCE and its potential effects on the 
human body, they concluded that Larson's physical and emotional 
symptomatology was likely due to his exposure to TCE in the mid-to-
late 1960s and early 1970s. (R.788-790; R.800; R.993; R.995; 
R.1461; R.1484; R.1571; R.1574-1573). 
After viewing the television program, Mrs. Larson began making 
inquiries of various health care providers on behalf of her 
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husband. (R.784-788; R.1528-1529) . In early 1985, Larson began 
receiving medical evaluations to determine whether his symptoms 
were the result of TCE exposure. (R.994; R.1538-1539). 
None of Larson's health care providers are able to state 
definitely that any of Larson's symptoms are the result of Larson's 
exposure to TCE. (R. 531). 
Larson's current manager, Bruce Kjar, considers Larson to be 
an excellent repairer and to have an absolutely phenomenal memory. 
(R.630; R.641-642; R.665-666). He has observed no significant 
personality changes in Larson at work. (R.651; R.644) Any changes 
in mood or personality which he has observed date from the time 
Larson was demoted from manager. (R.679-680). 
Larson's complaint with jury demand was filed on August 29, 
1988, more than 20 years after Larson's initial exposure and first 
recognition of symptoms. (R.2). 
By the time Larson filed his complaint, so much time had 
passed from the date of his initial exposure to TCE that neither 
his employer nor the defendants had records which would assist any 
of the parties in discovery. (R.536). Witnesses have disappeared 
and memories have faded over the past 20 years. Larson has been 
exposed to a number of other solvents and chemicals over the years, 
which would make it virtually impossible to determine whether his 
alleged symptoms are, or even could have been, caused by his 
exposure to TCE. (R.946-943; R.957; R.966-967). 
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Access to critical evidence has also been lost over the past 
twenty years• The vapor degreaser which Larson used is no longer 
available for inspection. It would be impossible, or nearly so, to 
determine whether Black & Decker used the vapor degreaser appropri-
ately, whether it followed the manufacturer's recommendations, 
whether it followed the TCE manufacturer's recommendations, and 
whether the employees of Black & Decker were obedient to Black & 
Decker's policies concerning the use of TCE and vapor degreasers. 
(R.536). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment was appropriate in this case because Larson's 
complaint was filed several years after the statute of limitations 
had run. Larson did not make the threshold showing of due 
diligence to avoid application of the statute, and did not 
establish special circumstances warranting application of the 
"discovery rule" exception. Summary judgment was also appropriate 
because Larson offered no medical testimony to establish that his 
alleged medical condition was caused by exposure to TCE, a 
requisite element beyond the knowledge of ordinary jurors. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON LARSON'S 
CLAIMS RAN MORE THAN TEN YEARS BEFORE 
LARSON FILED SUIT. 
Larson's Complaint set forth claims sounding in negligence, 
breach of warranty and strict liability in tort. Pending resolu-
tion of the motion for summary judgment, Larson abandoned his 
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breach of warranty claim, focusing solely on the negligence and 
product liability claims. 
Utah law provides that "an action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law" must be brought within four years "after the 
cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-1, 78-12-
25(3). Section 78-12-25, and its similarly worded predecessors, 
have long been held to apply to claims sounding in negligence. 
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 579 n. 1 (Utah App. 1990); 
Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244, 246 (1933). 
Additionally, because there was no other statute of limitations 
applicable to product liability claims, Section 78-12-25(3) would 
also apply to those claims.2 
It is well established in Utah that a cause of action accrues, 
and the statute of limitations begins to run, "upon the happening 
of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action . . . " 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992), 
quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). "A tort 
cause of action accrues when all its elements come into being and 
the claim is actionable." Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 
P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992). 
2
 At the time Larson filed his complaint, the former 
version of the product liability statute had been declared 
unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). The current statute, which 
requires suit to be filed within two years from the date a 
plaintiff knows or should know of the defect, had not yet been 
enacted. (See Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-1, et seq.) 
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"In traditional negligence cases, a cause of action accrues 
when all the elements necessary to maintenance of a lawsuit are 
present; the time of occurrence of the last of those elements is 
made the critical point of initial inquiry-11 Pavne bv and through 
Pavne v, Mvers, 743 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1987). The "last of those 
elements" in a negligence case is harm or injury. Id. at 189-90; 
Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985) (elements of 
negligence claim are duty, breach, causation, and damages). All 
the elements of a product liability claim are present if a person 
who is engaged in the business sells a defective and unreasonably 
dangerous product which is expected to, and does, reach the 
consumer without substantial change, and the product causes harm. 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co. . 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 
1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. 
Thus, in both negligence and product liability causes of 
action, the last event necessary to render a situation actionable 
is injury. At the very latest, therefore, Larson's complaint 
should have been filed no more than four years from the date his 
last symptom manifested itself. The parties agree that all of the 
symptoms from which Larson now suffers had manifested themselves by 
the time he was appointed to manage the Salt Lake office of Black 
& Decker, some time during the early 1970s. (R.558). Accordingly, 
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Larson's lawsuit was filed approximately 10 or 15 years too late 
under even the most liberal interpretation of his circumstances.3 
Larson seeks to avoid application of the general rule, 
however, by arguing that the statute of limitations in a product 
liability case does not begin to run until the plaintiff "become[s] 
aware of the causal relationship between the injury and the 
prospective defendant." (Brief of Appellant, p.10). Larson then 
asserts that a jury question exists as to when he first gained that 
knowledge. 
In support of this argument, Larson cites Foil v. Ballincrer, 
601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) and Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 
(Utah App. 1988), both of which addressed the statute of 
limitations governing medical malpractice claims, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14-4. Under that section, the statute of limitations in a 
medical malpractice case is "two years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury . . . " 
In Foil, the Utah Supreme Court held that the word "injury" in 
Section 78-14-4 means "legal injury." In other words, the statute 
of limitations on a medical malpractice claim does not begin to run 
3
 In actuality, Larson's cause of action accrued several 
years earlier, when he first began experiencing major symptoms in 
the late 1960s. Under the majority rule, once a substantial injury 
is manifested, the statute of limitations begins to run, even as to 
later discovered injuries. See, e.g., Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson 
& Co. , Inc. , 749 F.2d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 1984); Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 899 Comments c & e, § 910. 
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until a plaintiff knows, or reasonably could have learned, of the 
injury and its possible negligent cause. Id. 
As this Court noted in Deschamps, the Supreme Court's holding 
in Foil was based upon "concerns with the filing of unfounded 
claims and the temptation for health care providers to fail to 
advise patients of mistakes until after the limitations period has 
run . . . " Deschamps, supra, 784 P. 2d at 473. This Court has 
cited similar concerns in extending the modified accrual rule to 
legal malpractice cases. In Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P. 2d 16, 19 
(Utah App. 1989), the Court wrote, "[w]e think that fundamental 
fairness also requires the imposition of the discovery rule because 
the attorney-client relationship is based upon trust, and is a 
situation in which one less knowledgeable must rely on another, who 
has special expertise, for advice and assistance." The Court 
quoted favorably from a decision issued by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court: "The attorney, like the doctor, is an expert, and 
much of his work is done out of the client's view. The client is 
not an expert; he cannot be expected to recognize professional 
negligence if he sees it, and he should not be expected to watch 
over the professional or to retain a second professional to do so." 
Id., quoting Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131, 
135 (1974) . 
Foil and Merkley thus recognize a unique circumstance 
presented in professional malpractice cases: it is often the 
potential defendant upon whom plaintiff will rely for information 
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about his or her status. See, Stewart v. K&S Co., Inc., 591 P.2d 
433, 435 (Utah 1979) (M[w]here there is a fiduciary relationship, 
such as between corporate officers and a stockholder, the statute 
of limitations does not begin to run until the stockholder 
discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should discover, 
that there is a wrong to be complained of . . . " ) . 
In product liability cases involving personal injury, a 
plaintiff ordinarily will, and should, receive information 
necessary to know whether there is a cause of action from a neutral 
third party, namely a health care provider. There is no inherent 
conflict, and no affront to "fundamental fairness." 
Absent those considerations, the long-standing rule regarding 
accrual of tort actions applies to Larson's claims. Under 
precedent of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, Larson's 
negligence and product liability causes of action arose, and the 
four-year statute of limitations began to run, in the early 1970s. 
Larson urges the Court, however, to apply a different standard 
espoused by courts in other jurisdictions. In particular, Larson 
points to Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1980) 
(applying Oklahoma law) and Pereira v. Dow Chemical Company, Inc., 
129 Cal.App.3d 865, 181 Cal.Rptr. 364 (Cal.App. 1982). 
Larson's reliance on those cases is misplaced. The Utah 
Supreme Court has consistently explained the role and requirements 
of the discovery rule under Utah law. While Williams and Pereira 
cast the discovery rule in terms of when the cause of action 
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accrues, Utah recognizes the role of the discovery rule as an 
exception to, not an extension of, statutorily prescribed 
limitation periods. Except in cases involving relationships of 
trust, notably those involving professional malpractice, Utah 
applies the traditional rule of accrual to determine when a statute 
of limitations has run. Plaintiffs are not left without 
protection, however. If exceptional circumstances exist by which 
a plaintiff should be relieved of the uniform effects of a statute 
of limitations, plaintiffs may seek application of the discovery 
rule. 
The primary distinction between Utah's established system and 
that employed in Oklahoma or elsewhere is that Utah recognizes and 
preserves to a greater extent the purpose of statutes of 
limitations. A limitation period reflects a reasonable amount of 
time during which defendants should be on notice and at risk. If 
a plaintiff seeks to bring an action beyond that prescribed time, 
it is logical and fair to expect the plaintiff to demonstrate why 
he or she should be allowed. As discussed below in Points II and 
III, the Utah Supreme Court has outlined the procedure and burden 
a plaintiff must meet to invoke the discovery rule. Plaintiffs 
should not be permitted to circumvent those mandates by labeling 
their request as one for modification of normal accrual principles. 
Even if Larson's application of medical malpractice accrual 
principles were appropriate to his product liability and negligence 
claims, those claims would not be saved in any event. Larson 
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failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding when he 
knew, or should have known, of the possible cause of his injuries.4 
The district court determined from the Larsons' own testimony that 
a reasonable jury could not conclude Larson had acted with 
reasonable diligence. That conclusion is dispositive of Larson's 
accrual argument, regardless of how characterized.3 
II. LARSON FAILED TO HAKE A THRESHOLD SHOWING 
OF DUE DILIGENCE TO AVOID APPLICATION OF 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Larson seeks to avoid the effect of the statutes of limitations 
by arguing that the "discovery rule" should be applied to excuse 
his untimely filing. The district court agreed with Larson that 
"in some instances the statute does not begin to run until 
discovery of the cause of the injury is made by the claimant." 
However, the district court concluded that, based upon the 
undisputed facts and evidence adduced, no reasonable jury could 
4
 Deschamps clarified that the medical malpractice statute 
is triggered by notice of a possible, not probable, cause. 
5
 In the court below, Larson attempted to cure his statute 
of limitations problems by claiming that he did not understand that 
TCE could cause his symptoms until watching an unidentified 
television program in 1984. Larson alleged that his lawsuit was 
filed within four years from the date of that television program. 
However, as the district court noted, "[Larson] has been unable to 
ascertain the date he and his wife saw the television program in 
which the effects of TCE were discussed." (R.531). PPG after 
extensive investigation, was unable to locate any reference to the 
alleged broadcast. (R.587-592). Larson's failure to recall or 
offer evidence of any details regarding the claimed 1984 television 
program, such as the date upon which it aired, the network, or any 
other identifying information, made it impossible to test the 
validity of his claim, and was insufficient to take this claim of 
late discovery outside the realm of speculation. 
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find that Larsons complaint was filed within four years of when 
plaintiff knew or should have known of his potential cause of 
action. (R.535-36). 
On appeal, Larson argues that a jury could find that he 
reasonably believed his symptoms were caused by personal factors, 
such as a recent marriage and beginning a new job, rather than some 
external source. In light of the severe physical symptoms which 
plaintiff admittedly began noticing as early as the mid-1960s — 
including bleeding sinuses, dizziness, and memory loss — and the 
undisputed fact that the symptoms only manifested themselves after 
plaintiff's initial exposure to TCE, the district court was correct 
in concluding that the highly improbable scenario presented by 
plaintiff was insufficient to raise an issue of fact for the jury. 
Larson's arguments to the contrary fail to recognize that it 
is Larson's burden to establish due diligence. The Utah Supreme 
Court has noted that, before a court need make any determination 
regarding applicability of a discovery rule, a plaintiff must make 
a showing — "as a threshold matter" — that he or she did not know 
the facts giving rise to the cause of action, and could not learn 
them through the exercise of due diligence. O'Neal v. Division of 
Family Services, State of Utah. 821 P.2d 1139, 1144; Warren v. 
Provo City Corp. , 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) ("an initial 
showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know of and could 
not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action 
in time to file a claim within the limitation period.") 
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Absent evidence necessary to satisfy his initial burden of 
demonstrating reasonable diligence, Larson may not invoke the 
"discovery" exception to avoid the statute of limitations. As in 
Warren, the plaintiff here "has not alleged any facts demonstrating 
that he undertook reasonable steps to investigate [the defendant's] 
liability. Therefore, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has not 
shown that he could not have reasonably known about the cause of 
action in time to file his claim within the statutory period." Id. 
at 1129. 
Application of these well-established principles is 
dispositive of Larson's challenge to the district court's ruling. 
As the district court noted, "[t]his was not a case wherein the 
disease or ailment laid dormant or was latent before manifesting 
its symptoms; therefore, plaintiff would have no reason for not 
pursuing medical attention or filing a suit at an earlier time." 
The court reached its determination in light of the uncontroverted 
fact that all of Larson's symptoms manifested themselves shortly 
after the exposure to TCE, but by his own admission Larson did not 
pursue medical attention or make any real attempt to learn what was 
causing his physical and emotional problems for some twenty years. 
Larson misses the point distinguishing cases by emphasizing 
his own claimed ignorance of a causal link. The actual point is 
that Larson did nothing to find out what was causing his alleged 
symptoms, unlike the plaintiffs in Williams, Pereira, Mann v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 741 P.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1984), and Hando v. PPG 
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Industries, 771 P.2d 956 (Mont. 1989), all cited by Larson. 
Larson's alleged fear of doctors cannot excuse his duty to exercise 
due diligence. Cf. O'Neal, supra (psychological inability to 
disclose abuse insufficient to toll statute). 
Larson argues, however, that the district court impermissibly 
made findings of fact based upon the evidence presented to it. 
While Larson does not point to a particular finding of fact by the 
court, he argues that "taking oral testimony is inconsistent with 
the rule that the Court on summary judgment may not weigh the 
evidence, determine credibility issues, nor make findings." (Brief 
of Appellant at 22) . The difficulty with Larson's argument is that 
it fails to recognize the purpose of the hearing held by the 
district court. The transcript of the hearing (R.556) and the 
district court's Memorandum Decision (R.52 0) refute Larson's 
characterization of the district court's actions. The court 
provided Larson with a generous opportunity to present live (and 
thus presumably more extensive) evidence on the primary issue 
raised in the motion for summary judgment: whether Larson could 
present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact to avoid application of the statute of limitations. 
Nowhere in the hearing transcript, Memorandum Decision, or 
Order and Judgment is there any suggestion that the district court 
"resolv[ed] factual matters against plaintiff," as Larson claims. 
The court could have read the deposition testimony of Larson and 
his wife and reached the same conclusion. The court simply 
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determined that the evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact. Sufficiency of the evidence to submit an 
issue to the jury is a question of law, not of fact. Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985). 
III. LARSON FAILED TO ESTABLISH EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING APPLICATION OF 
THE DISCOVERY RULE IN ANY EVENT. 
Even if Larson had met the threshold showing of due diligence, 
Larson would then have to establish that exceptional circumstances 
warranted invocation of the discovery rule. The Utah Supreme Court 
has observed that courts may find the discovery rule applicable 
under three circumstances. O'Neal, supra, at 1143; Klinger v 
Kicrhtly. 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990). The first two, where the 
discovery rule is mandated by statute or a defendant has taken 
steps to conceal the cause of action, are not argued by Larson. 
Under the third circumstance, "without regard to any showing 
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of 
action, the discovery rule may be applied where the case presents 
xexceptional circumstances or causes of action where the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust."1 
O'Neal, supra, 821 P.2d at 1143, quoting Myers, supra, 635 P.2d at 
86. The party seeking to avoid the statute of limitations bears the 
burden of proving the existence of such exceptional circumstances. 
O'Neal, supra, 821 P.2d at 1144. 
Larson failed to offer any evidence or argument demonstrating 
the existence of exceptional circumstances. In fact, the 
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circumstances of the case militate against such a finding. If ever 
there was a case warranting application of the statute of 
limitations, this is it. Such statutes "are designed to promote 
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that 
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories 
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Myers. supra, 635 
P.2d at 86, quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 
L.Ed.2d 788 (1944). 
Larson allowed 24 years to pass from the date of his exposure 
to TCE before filing suit. Many of the symptoms of which he 
complains were known to him as early as 1964; all of them were 
known to him by 1972. His only stated excuse for not exploring the 
cause of the symptoms was distrust of doctors. Both the law and 
the facts of this case demonstrate the correctness of the district 
court's conclusion that Larson's claims were barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ALSO APPROPRIATE 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD NOT ADDUCED 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION. 
In his memorandum decision, the district court also noted that 
Larson had no evidence that his alleged injuries were caused by 
exposure to TCE. As the district court noted, "the health care 
providers have not been able to definitely state that any of the 
plaintiff's symptoms are the result of his exposure to TCE.11 
(R.531) . 
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Dismissal of Larson's action for insufficient evidence of 
causation was warranted under the precedent of this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court. The alleged long-term effects of a chemical 
compound such as TCE, and the actual cause of Larson's various 
medical complaints, are subjects not within the ordinary knowledge 
of a layperson. Absent expert medical testimony, no genuine issue 
of material fact existed on this issue. Reeves v. Geicrv 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah App. 1988) (expert 
medical testimony required to establish that skin injuries were 
caused by prescription drugs); cf. King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.. 832 P.2d 858, 864-65 (Utah 1992). 
The need for expert testimony is particularly great in this 
type of case, where a determination of causation would require 
elimination of other likely causes, such as exposure to various 
other chemicals over the intervening years. Moreover, the 
causative elements might differ for particular individual 
conditions, which would be difficult for a lay jury to distinguish 
without assistance from a medical expert. 
Larson's own physicians would not state that Larson's symptoms 
were probably caused by TCE, and Larson did not offer any other 
medical evidence. "Where the proximate cause of an injury is left 
to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law." Mitchell, 
supra, 697 P.2d at 24 6, quoting Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of 
Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 684 (Utah 1982). In this case, a 
determination that Larson's alleged injuries were caused by 
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exposure to TCE would have been nothing but speculation. Larson's 
complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to adduce sufficient 
evidence of causation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellees respectfully 
request that the district court's judgment and order be affirmed. 
DATED this y^ day of July, 1993. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
l\AM4k 
Jay E. Jejnsen 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellees 
PPG Industries, Inc., and 
Diamond Shamrock Company 
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CIVIL NO. C-88-5604 
An evidentiary hearing was held on June 3, 1991 pursuant to 
Motions filed by the defendants Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. 
and PPG Industries. Plaintiff was represented by Stanley R. 
Smith. Defendants PPG and Diamond Shamrock were represented by 
Jay E. Jensen. Defendant Retep Corporation was represented by 
Alma G. Peterson. The causes of action against Thatcher 
Chemical Co. and Wasatch Chemical Co. were heretofore dismissed 
with prejudice. 
The Court heard the testimony of witnesses, read the 
Memoranda filed and took the matter under advisement. For some 
unknown reason the file was returned to the clerk's office 
without the Motion for Summary Judgment being ruled upon and 
counsel advised accordingly. The Court now enters its ruling. 
(\ftC\~S'^ 
LARSON V, PPG INDUSTRIES PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The plaintiff claims that during the years 1964 through 
1974 he was exposed to the chemical trichloroethylene ("TCE") 
while being in the employment of Black and Decker as a tool 
repairman, 
TCE was used to clean power tools. Employees, when using 
TCE, had available for their protection rubber gloves, air 
purifying respirators and ready access to a washroom. 
Plaintiff did not use the respirator at all times or wash his 
hands regularly when working with the TCE. 
Within a few months after being employed by Black and 
Decker, plaintiff began to experience physical and emotional 
symptoms, such as headaches, bleeding from the sinuses, 
dizziness, mood changes, irritability, lack of sex drive, 
memory loss, and he became abusive with his wife and family. 
Even though one or more of these symptoms manifested 
themselves, plaintiff did not seek medical attention. 
Plaintiff contends that while watching a television program 
in 1984 he was alerted to the potential harmful effects of 
TCE. However, it was not until some four years later that he 
filed this action. 
The issue presented to the Court is whether or not 
plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
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LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations did not 
begin to run until plaintiff saw the television program in 
1984, about TCE which made him aware of his claim for injuries. 
The Court agrees that in some instances the statute does 
not begin to run until discovery of the cause of the injury is 
made by the claimant. 
The credible evidence leads the Court to find that the 
symptoms manifested themselves shortly after the exposure to 
TCE, but plaintiff did not pursue medical attention or attempt 
to learn what was causing his physical and emotional problems. 
This was not a case wherein the disease or ailment laid 
dormant or was latent before manifesting its symptoms; 
therefore, plaintiff would have no reason for not pursuing 
medical attention or filing a suit at an earlier time. 
Plaintiff has been unable to ascertain the date he and his 
wife saw the television program in which the effects of TCE 
were discussed. In addition, the health care providers have 
not been able to definitely state that any of the plaintiff's 
symptoms are the result of his exposure to TCE. 
The Court concludes that these defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be granted. 
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LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court refers the parties to these defendants7 
Memorandum and Reply Memorandum for additional reasons why the 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
Dated this ° day of December, 1991. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this (?~ day of December, 1991: 
Stanley R. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 N. Center Street 
P.O. Box 310 
American Fork, Utah 84003-0310 
Jay E. Jensen 
Attorney for PPG and Diamond Shamrock 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Alma G. Peterson 
Attorney for Defendant Retep Corp. 
27 3 5 Thunderbird Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
000592 
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Jay E. Jensen, #1676 
Phillip S. Ferguson, #1063 
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Attorneys for PPG and Diamond Shamrock 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. LARSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
Pennsylvania corporation; 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS 
COMPANY, a Delaware 
corporation; THATCHER CHEMICAL 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
WASATCH CHEMICAL COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; and RETEP 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-05604 
Judge John A. Rokich 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants PPG 
Industries, Inc., and Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Company, on or 
about May 25, 1990, came on for hearing before the Honorable John 
A. Rokich on July 30, 1990. The plaintiff was represented by 
Stanley R. Smith and defendants PPG and Diamond Shamrock were 
represented by Phillip S. Ferguson. Retep was present through its 
President, Alma G. Peterson, although it was not represented by 
counsel. Retep joined in the Motion in open Court. The Motion was 
held in abeyance for 90 days pending further discovery by the 
plaintiff. It came on for hearing a second time on January 7, 
00053d 
1991. Before ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court 
elected to conduct an evidentiary hearing which occurred on June 3, 
1991. Retep was neither present nor represented at the evidentiary 
hearing. The Court, having studied the memoranda filed by the 
parties, having considered the testimony offered by plaintiff and 
defendants on the issue of the statute of limitations, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters the following 
Order and Judgment: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The statute of limitations applicable to this case is 
§ 78-12-25(3), the general four year statute of limitations. 
2. The statute of limitations ordinarily begins to run when 
the last event giving rise to the cause of action occurs which, in 
this case, was no later than December 31, 1974. 
3. The recognized exceptions to the general rule regarding 
the commencement of the statue of limitations, collectively known 
as the discovery rule, do not apply in this case because (a) there 
is no provision for the cipplication of the discovery rule within 
the statute itself; (b) it is undisputed that plaintiff was aware 
of all of the symptoms of which he now complains by 1974, most of 
them within months of his first exposure to TCE in 1964 and 1965; 
(c) although plaintiff sought occasional medical attention for his 
various symptoms, it is undisputed that plaintiff made no effort to 
learn the cause of his symptoms until several weeks after viewing 
an unidentified television program in 1984; (d) there is no 
evidence that defendants concealed or misled or attempted to 
2 
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conceal or mislead or otherwise prevent plaintiff from learning any 
information about triclorolethylene and the potential side effects, 
if any, caused by exposure to triclorolethylene in the work place 
environment; (e) there are no exceptional circumstances which 
prevented plaintiff from seeking treatment and filing suit many 
years earlier than he did. 
4. To the extent the discovery rule may be applicable to 
this case, plaintiff's delay of fourteen to twenty-four years 
before making any effort to learn the cause of his symptoms was not 
justified, and reasonable minds cannot differ with regard to 
whether plaintiff should have made an attempt to determine whether 
his symptoms were caused by exposure to triclorolethylene prior to 
viewing the unidentified television program sometime in 1984. 
5. Plaintiff's long delay in attempting to connect his 
symptoms with his exposure to triclorolethylene has made it 
virtually impossible for the parties to discover credible evidence 
regarding who supplied the triclorolethylene to plaintiff's 
employer, whether all applicable instructions and warnings were 
transmitted by the distributors to the employer, whether the 
plaintiff was exposed to other chemicals, toxic substances, or 
circumstances which could account for his symptoms, and whether the 
symptoms from which plaintiff suffers were caused by exposure to 
triclorolethylene, all of which constitutes serious prejudice to 
the defendants should plaintiff be allowed to pursue his claim. 
6. For all other reasons set forth in the Memorandum in 
Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and their Reply 
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Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Judgment is entered herewith in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action. Defendants are awarded their 
costs incurred herein. 
DATED this / 7 day of ^znu&r^\ 1 9 9 ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
JL- /? \-M 
jQhri/A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
'AJ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Stanley R. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4 
